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THE SPECTRUM OF ANIMAL RATIONALITY IN PLUTARCH 
14,783 Words (incl. Abstract, Bibliography, Acknowledgement, and Endnotes) 
 
Abstract: Thanks to the work of Stephen Newmyer, Plutarch's importance for modern philosophical 
debates concerning animal rationality and rights has been brought to the forefront.  But Newmyer's 
important scholarship overlooks Plutarch's commitment to a range of rational functions that can be 
ascribed to animals of various sorts throughout the Moralia.  Through an application of the 'spectrum of 
animal rationality’ described in the treatise On Moral Virtue to the dialogues where his interlocutors 
explore the rational capacities of non-human animals (especially Whether Land or Sea Animals are 
Smarter and Gryllus), this article argues that Plutarch's commitment to a broad and inclusive sense of 
'reason' conditions any positive account of animal rationality.  Rather, any suggestions of the rational 
capacities of non-human animals are deeply implicated in Plutarch's universal system of reason, which 
differentiates grades of rationality to animals based on natural difference - not unlike his contemporary 
Stoics.  While modern proponents of animal rationality might find some of Plutarch's ideas unpalatable, 
the upshot of this study is a fuller sense of Plutarch's articulate and inclusive sense of reason, which is 
able to accommodate not only Platonist and Peripatetic notions, but also those of the Stoics and 
Epicureans, who are especially singled out in the humorous dialogue Gryllus.  Thus, Plutarch's 
'eclecticism' can be explained as a deep commitment to a universal notion of 'reason', marked by a 
range of functions accessible to all animals - including his philosophical enemies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Over the past decade, scholarship has gradually come to recognize the significance of Plutarch 
of Chaeronea’s arguments in favor of (non-human) animal rationality.  Prominent in this discussion has 
been the work of Stephen Newmyer, whose monograph Animals, Rights, and Reason in Plutarch and 
Modern Ethics (London, 2006) sought to bridge the gap between ancient and modern debates 
concerning animal cognition, or, in Newmyer’s words, ‘to explore in…depth the topic of possible 
continuity between ancient thought on animal issues and the arguments of philosophers of the modern 
animal rights movement’, by reference especially to various works written by Plutarch.1  Taking his lead 
from the work of Richard Sorabji2 and Francesco Becchi3, Newmyer sought to illustrate the 
contributions of Plutarch to modern philosophical and legal discussions concerning animal cognition 
and rights, whilst still maintaining the proper historical distance that is required in order to escape the 
charge of anachronism.4  According to Newmyer, ‘Plutarch betrays a remarkably ‘modern’ sensitivity to 
animals as feeling and suffering creatures that distinguishes much of the literature of the contemporary 
animal rights movement but which is largely absent from extant ancient works on animal issues’5.  
Newmyer goes even further, arguing that ‘Plutarch’s writings on animal rights provide a bridge 
between early speculations on the nature of animalkind and the almost unbelievably sophisticated and 
subtle arguments evolved by contemporary ethical philosophers who contend that the mental 
capacities of animals entitle them to better treatment at the hands of their human counterparts’.6    
 What is remarkable about Newmyer’s assessment is his commitment to two assumptions 
regarding Plutarch’s place in the history of the philosophy of (non-human) animal rationality: on the 
one hand, Plutarch develops some novel ‘arguments’ concerning these issues which, due to their ethical 
and philosophical content, are thought to be relevant to modern philosophers and theorists of animal 
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rights; on the other, as Newmyer expressly states, ‘Plutarch was neither a systematic philosopher nor 
an observational scientist’.7  In this paper, I shall take issue with this second assertion and attempt to 
show that it is Newmyer’s a priori denial of the systematic nature of Plutarch’s philosophical project 
(and I mean ‘project’ in the strongest sense) that leads him to misconstrue a significant portion of the 
evidence concerning Plutarch’s approach to animal rationality.  Indeed, it is precisely because Newmyer 
rejects the systematicity of Plutarch’s philosophy that he is able to make concessions to modern 
philosophers and theorists of (non-human) animal rights, with the effect of making Plutarch appear to 
be more ‘relevant’ to modern philosophers than, in fact, he might actually be.  Or, another way to put it, 
by denying Plutarch the status of being a ‘systematic’ philosopher, Newmyer passes over particular 
commitments of Plutarch’s which might strike modern philosophers of mind as absurd, or, worse, 
compromise the project of animal ethics.8  In the process of seeking ‘relevance’ in Plutarch’s work, so I 
will argue, Newmyer concurrently suppresses Plutarch’s project of developing a wide and inclusive 
sense of animal ‘rationality’ – we might call it a ‘spectrum of rationality’9 – that cannot, so I argue, be 
separated from its larger philosophical context, involving not only epistemology and ethics, but also 
psychology and metaphysics.10  In the first part of this article, I will pursue this line of inquiry by 
reference to a text of central importance to our understanding of Plutarch’s philosophy of mind, a 
philosophical dialogue entitled Whether Land or Sea Animals are Smarter, and a treatise which features 
the most systematic presentation in Plutarch’s corpus of his notion of animal mind, soul, and their 
functions, called On Moral Virtue.11  I hope to show that Plutarch’s proposals are not so progressive, in 
part because he understands the relationship of humans to non-human animals as analogous to the 
relationship between rationality and irrationality, broadly construed.  In the second part of this article, I 
will turn to a baffling text from Plutarch’s Moralia that deals with animal rationality, Plutarch’s dialogue 
On the Fact that Irrational Animals Employ Logos or, as it’s more commonly known, Gryllus, in order to 
test the value of my hypothetical model of the ‘spectrum of rationality’ for Plutarch’s work.  There, we 
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will see that Plutarch’s porcine interlocutor, Gryllus, reflects an Epicurean position regarding animal 
rationality, and that this commitment results in an apparent conflict between Epicurean arguments 
against the mismanagement of human emotions and thought and Platonist axiologies of human and 
non-human knowledge.  In the end, I will argue that Plutarch’s advancement of a notion of the 
spectrum of rationality is sufficient to, and in fact may be required to, accommodate both the 
Epicurean and the Platonist positions on animal rationality that Plutarch advances, resulting in a 
universal comprehension of reason that makes a place in the philosophical economy not only for human 
and non-human animals, but also for Platonists and Epicureans, despite the flaws in the latter’s 
reasoning. 
 
PLUTARCH ON ANIMAL COGNITION: THE SPECTRUM OF RATIONALITY 
 
 Let’s begin with the most elaborate version of Plutarch’s theory of (non-human) animal 
rationality before turning to a more general notion of animal rationality in Plutarch’s works.  The 
elaborate version of (non-human) animal rationality is described at the beginning of Whether Land or 
Sea Animals are Smarter, and it is spoken by a character named Autobulus.  Autobulus’ speech consists 
of a theoretical justification for animal rationality, and it sets the foundation for the rest of the 
argument of the dialogue, concerning whether animals which live on land or in the sea possess more 
φρόνησις (the word I’ve translated as ‘practical reasoning’, or, perhaps more colloquially, ‘smarts’), 
which will be taken over by two other otherwise unknown interlocutors, Aristotimus and Phaedimus.  
But the name ‘Aristobulus’ unfortunately presents us with a problem that is not irrelevant to our current 
investigation: apparently, both Plutarch’s father, and one of his sons, were named Autobulus.  About 
the former, Plutarch’s father, very little is known; he appears primarily as a speaker in Plutarch’s Table-
Talk (I.2-3, III.7-9) and is rendered as something of a country gentleman who shows authority in the 
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ethics of symposiastic behavior.12  One bit of evidence that has encouraged scholars to believe that the 
Autobulus of Whether Land or Sea Animals are Smarter is Plutarch’s father is that, at one point in the 
dialogue, Autobulus refers to his ‘son’ as following the path of justice set out by Plato (presumably in 
the Republic).13  Autobulus does not, it must be noted, refer to Plutarch by name here, so we cannot be 
absolutely sure that the ‘son’ of this Autobulus was, in fact, Plutarch.14  On the other side there is 
Plutarch’s son Autobulus, who appears as a chief interlocutor in Plutarch’s Dialogue on Love (Amatorius) 
who recounts his father Plutarch’s arguments concerning the nature of love, and, more importantly for 
our purposes, an interlocutor in two of Plutarch’s questions in the eighth book of the Table-Talk (VIII.2, 
VIII.10).15  There, it becomes clear that Plutarch’s son Autobulus was a philosopher in a strong sense: he 
reveals an impulsive commitment to dialectic, for example, by challenging arguments of Aristotle 
concerning dream divination (VIII.10, 735c-736d) through appeal to empirical observation16, and a 
serious interest in metaphysics by developing an elaborate Pythagoreanizing explanation of how the 
cosmos was generated from the imposition of the limiter, as formal substance, upon the unlimited, as 
material substance (VIII.2, 719c-e).17  So, we are led to another difficulty in assessing the arguments of 
Plutarch concerning animal rationality: if his speaker in the dialogue is Plutarch’s father Autobulus, a 
country gentleman who distinguishes himself from philosophers, then the presentation of arguments 
for animal rationality will be conditioned by their interlocutor’s status as non-philosopher; similarly, if 
the speaker is Plutarch’s son Autobulus, a committed philosopher, observer of nature, and dialectician, 
then our attention will be directed towards the philosophical aspects of the speech.   
 With that question in mind, let’s have a look at how the theoretical argument for animal 
rationality develops in the dialogue.  The topic of today’s discussion, whether land or sea animals are 
superior in ‘sagacity’ (σύνεσις)18 is introduced, initially, by a reiteration of ‘yesterday’s’ discussion at a 
symposium (959c)19, which concerned the extent to which all animals partake of or share in higher-
order forms of reasoning: 
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By expressing the view yesterday, as you know, that all animals, in one way or another, share in 
thinking and reasoning (μετέχειν ἁμωσγέπως πάντα τὰ ζῷα διανοίας καὶ  λογισμοῦ), we provided 
our young hunters a pleasant and delightful subject for debate, namely that of the sagacity 
(σύνεσις) of land-dwelling versus sea-dwelling creatures.  It seems that we shall decide the issue 
if the adherents of Aristotimus and Phaedimus stand by their challenges.  The former offered to 
be the advocate for the position that the land engenders animals that excel in practical reasoning 
(διαφέροντα τῷ φρονεῖ ν), the latter that the sea does so. 
(Plutarch, Whether Land or Sea Animals are Smarter 2, 960a-b, trans. after Newmyer 2011, pp. 17-
18)20 
Autobulus sets the agenda for the first and second parts of the dialogue: in the first part, we see 
Autobulus summarize ‘yesterday’s’ arguments, which focus on demonstrating that all animals share 
(μετέχειν) in a qualified way (ἁμωσγέπως)21 in two cognitive processes, ‘thinking’ (διανοία) and 
‘reasoning’ (λογισμός), both of which are understood to contribute to animal ‘sagacity’ (σύνεσις).  And 
the debate to come in today’s dialogue focuses on which animals surpass others in practical reasoning 
(τῷ φρονεῖ ν).  Let me deal with translation of the terms λογισμός, διανοία, and φρονεῖ ν here, before 
turning to σύνεσις later in this paper.  Now Newmyer translates διανοία generally as ‘thought’, and 
λογισμός as ‘reason’; and he translates φρονεῖ ν as ‘intelligence’.22  I would push Newmyer here on all 
three of these translations: in my opinion, Newmyer has reduced to abstract concepts certain cognitive 
activities or functions (‘thinking’ to ‘thought’, ‘reasoning’ to ‘reason’).  Indeed, as we see in Plato’s 
Republic (511b2-e5 and especially 533d6-534a8) and Sophist (263e3-5), διανοία indicates (within 
Platonist epistemology)23 discursive activity that occurs prior (in time)24 to grasping the truth – an 
interpretation that is adjusted to the activity of judgment in Plutarch’s treatise On Moral Virtue, which 
lays out his most explicit thoughts on epistemology and moral psychology.25  Similarly, in the same 
treatise, Plutarch explains more carefully what he thinks λογισμός is, explaining that it is what inclines 
7 
 
towards truth and expels falsehood once it is presented with the truth; it is, then, the faculty and 
activity of (correct) judgment.26  Interestingly, Plutarch there also mentions that λογισμός in most 
animals, i.e. those who are not able to control their emotions (especially harmful emotions such as 
pleasure, fear, pain, and desire), is suppressed (literally ‘checked and confused’) in their presence.27  As a 
consequence, so Plutarch says, sense perception (αἴ σθησις), which is the contact point between reason 
and emotion, becomes the judge (κριτήριον) in various sorts of epistemic deliberations.28  So, when 
Plutarch speaks of all animals sharing of διανοία and λογισμός he means that they have the capacity to 
make reasoned judgments in very specific circumstances – in the presence of truth, and when they are 
in control of their emotions. 
 The second issue is figuring out what Autobulus means when he refers to all animals, sea or 
land, having some faculty for φρονεῖ ν, which I’ve translated ‘practical reasoning’. Here, again, we need 
to appeal to Plutarch’s On Moral Virtue, where he expressly differentiates several functions of ‘reason’ 
(λόγος): 
But inasmuch as they [sc. Stoics] do not make virtue as a whole a mean nor apply it to the 
 term ‘ethical’, we must discuss the difference, starting from the first principles above.  Now, 
there are two kinds of things, those which exist absolutely, and others which are somehow 
relative to us (τὰ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἔχοντα τὰ δὲ πῶς ἔχοντα πρὸς ἡμᾶς).  Among those that are absolute, 
there are earth, heaven, stars, sea; among those that are relative to us, good and bad, things to 
be desired and things to be avoided, what is pleasurable and what is painful.  Now reason 
contemplates (τοῦ λόγου θεωροῦντος)29 both; when it is contemplating those that are absolute, 
it is scientific and contemplative; when it is contemplating those that are somehow relative to us, 
it is deliberative and practical.  The virtue of the latter [mode of reason] is ‘practical wisdom’ 
(φρόνησις), and of the former ‘wisdom’ (σοφία).  And ‘practical wisdom’ differs from ‘wisdom’ in 
that when the contemplative mode is attendant to and arranged towards the practical and 
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emotive, ‘practical wisdom’ comes to subsist in accordance with reason.  Therefore, ‘practical 
wisdom’ has need of chance (τύχη), but ‘wisdom’ has no need of it, nor yet of deliberation, to 
attain its proper end.  For ‘wisdom’ concerns the things that subsist eternally as such… 
And, a bit later on, 
But it is necessary for ‘practical wisdom’ (φρόνησις), when it has descended (καθιεῖ σα) into 
things that are full of error and confusion, to intermingle with things that are often subject to 
chance; to employ the deliberative mode in the case of things that are not very clear; and, by 
reducing the deliberative to the practical mode, finally to activate it in judgments in which the 
irrational is attendant and has influence. 
(Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 5, 443d-444a) 
Several interesting aspects of Autobulus’ approach to animal rationality are illuminated by comparison 
with Plutarch’s On Moral Virtue.  First of all, it is clear that Plutarch is extremely attentive to the many 
modalities of ‘reason’ that could fall under the term ‘animal rationality’, specifically attributing to ‘all 
animals’ the capacity for, on the one hand, making reasoned judgments concerning what is true as long 
as their emotions are in a correct state, and on the other, deliberating and acting pragmatically in cases 
involving things that are ‘relative to us’, including those things that are subject to chance and, 
sometimes, things tainted by what is irrational.   Secondly, these modalities appear to each be 
functions that λόγος, or ‘reason’, obtains in reference to diverse objects of its application, whether they 
are absolutes (τὰ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἔχοντα), or relatives (τὰ δὲ πῶς ἔχοντα πρὸς ἡμᾶς).30  Hence, ‘reason’s’ 
signature activity is contemplation, but the contemplation of absolutes is understood to be ‘wisdom’ 
(σοφία), whereas the contemplation of relatives is understood to be ‘practical wisdom’ (φρόνησις).31   
‘Reason’, or λόγος, thus has many applications, and can be used not simply for contemplation of 
absolutes, but also for practical and deliberative activities which, as we will see, fall to non-human 
animals.32  From this perspective, ‘reason’ has very wide applications indeed, and at both ends of the so-
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called spectrum.33  Finally, through a process that seems to involve adjusting the deliberative function 
of reason to its practical end, φρόνησις engages in judgments that are directed towards things that are 
irrational, or at least those are under the influence of irrationality.  He does not explain what those 
things are here.  Generally, then, φρόνησις, for Plutarch, simply does not involve the highest function of 
reasoning, as does σοφία, or ‘wisdom’. 
 If φρόνησις is the kind of reason that deals with the irrational, what, we might ask, does 
Plutarch mean by referring to those things that are influenced by irrationality?34   Here, remarkably, we 
can return to Autobulus’ arguments in Whether Land or Sea Animals are Smarter.  Autobulus’ 
interlocutor Soclarus takes Autobulus’ arguments to refer to something like a spectrum of rationality, 
i.e. a notion that rationality extends throughout the entire universe, in various grades or modes.35 At 
any rate, Soclarus raises a pertinent objection to Autobulus’ ‘spectrum of rationality’, one that he claims 
to have heard from the Stoics – an argument from opposites: ‘just as what is immortal is opposite to 
mortal, and imperishable to perishable, and incorporeal to corporeal; so too, if reasoning is subsistent, 
is it not the case that the irrational must be opposite and subsist as its contrary, and moreover that this 
alone [sc. reasoning] among so many pairings must not be left incomplete and mutilated?’36  Another 
way to put it: if reasoning is to be complete, how could it subsist without its opposite, irrationality? 
 Autobulus’ response, I suggest, help us to understand how φρόνησις works, and how all 
animals share of discursive thinking and reasoning in the process of employing practical wisdom.  In 
particular, so Autobulus says, what is ‘irrational’ is simply what is not endowed with soul; the 
implication is that animals, when they employ φρόνησις, do so in their interactions with inanimate 
objects, which are subject to ‘chance’ according to Plutarch in On Moral Virtue.  This occurs, so 
Autobulus says, within the broader context of ‘nature’ (φύσις). With regard to the nature of the soul 
itself, however, things might be more complicated.  As Autobulus notes, in an extended argument,  
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If someone were to maintain that nature is not incomplete, but that the nature that is animate 
must possess, on the one hand, the rational, and on the other the irrational, another person 
might maintain that the nature that is animate must possess the imaginative, and the non-
imaginative; and the sentient, and non-sentient; [they would be saying this] so that nature has 
these, as it were, counterbalanced correlatives and opposite states and privations about this 
genus.  But if he who seeks that, of the animate, there be both the sentient and the non-sentient, 
as well as the imaginative and the non-imaginative, is absurd – because every animate thing is 
straightaway when born both sentient and imaginative – he will unreasonably demand of the 
animate that there be the rational and the irrational, since he is arguing against people who 
believe that nothing shares of sensation (αἰ σθήσεως μετέχειν) that does not also have a share of 
sagacity (σύνεσις), and that there is no animal unto which some opinion (δόξα) and reasoning 
(λογισμός) are present, just as sensation (αἴ σθησις) and impulse (ὁρμή) are present to it.  For 
nature, which they [sc. the Peripatetic and Platonist philosophers] say correctly does everything 
for the sake of something (ἕνεκά του) and relative to something (πρός τι), did not make the 
animal sentient for the purpose of simply sensing something that it suffers; but since there are 
many things that are proper (οἰ κεία) to it, and many that are alien (ἀλλοτρία), it would not 
survive for a moment if it had not learned to protect itself from the latter, and associate with the 
former.  To be sure, it is sensation that offers to each animal recognition (γνῶσις)37 equally in both 
cases; but, in animals born not for reckoning, judging, remembering, and attending to 
something, there could be no [other] mechanism for the acts of seizure or pursuit that follow 
upon the sensation of beneficial things, nor for the avoiding and fleeing from things that are 
destructive or painful.  Those animals which you deprive of anticipation, memory, design, and 
preparation – and of the activities of hoping, fearing, desiring, and grieving – they would have no 
benefit of the presence of their eyes, nor of their ears… 
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(Plutarch, Whether Land or Sea Animals are Smarter 3, 960c-d, trans. after Newmyer 2011) 
As we can see, Autobulus raises the pertinent objection, which arises out of the argument from 
opposites posed by Soclarus, that committing too strongly to such antitheses leads one to contradict 
nature – as it is observed empirically.  He appeals to the familiar Aristotelian (and Stoic)38 notion that 
nature does nothing in vain and always does something to some end – what Aristotle called the ‘final 
cause’ of something39 – and is always relative to something else, a more general Platonist claim that 
Aristotle himself would have likely rejected.40  This means that nature, as Autobulus construes it, deals 
with things that are subject to change and chance, and not with absolutes; and if we are going to 
subject the soul to the claim that it must possess both rational and irrational parts, we would need to 
admit both (a) that it would possess the faculties of imagination and non-imagination, as well as 
sentience and non-sentience, which is plainly absurd from observation of all newborn animals; and (b) 
that the ‘irrational’ parts the soul does possess, which would include material parts that cannot operate 
without it, such as bones and fingernails, would be employed to no good use in the case of, once again, 
newborn animals.   
 It should now be clear, I think, that the Autobulus of Whether Sea or Land Animals are Smarter 
must be Plutarch’s son, the young and energetic scholar steeped in Classical and Hellenistic philosophy: 
he understands and uses technical vocabulary derived from Platonist and Peripatetic philosophy 
without difficulty, demonstrating a keen capacity to summarize and critically assess arguments put 
forward by his predecessors and integrate them successfully into a philosophical dialectic.  What is 
especially interesting here about young Autobulus’ refutation of Soclarus’ argument from opposites is 
his appeal to arguments regarding animal self-preservation made not by Platonists or Peripatetics, but 
by Stoics.41  Let’s have a quick look at a portion of these arguments, which are preserved by Seneca in 
the 1st Century CE, and by Hierocles the Stoic roughly a century later: 
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No animal comes into life without fear of death. Someone says, ‘How is it possible for an animal 
that has been born to possess a comprehension (intellectum) of things that are beneficial or 
destructive?’  The first thing to ask isn’t how it comprehends, but whether it comprehends.  Yet it 
is obvious (apparet) that they possess comprehension from the fact that, if they were to 
comprehend [only after birth], they would do nothing more [than they would have done if they 
weren’t].  What is the reason why the hen neither flees from the peacock nor the goose, but does 
flee from the hawk, which is so much smaller and not even known (notum) to it?  Why would 
chicks fear a cat, but not a dog?  It is obvious (apparet) that a comprehension (scientiam) of their 
being harmed is inherent (inesse) in them, and not derived from experience; for they avoid 
something prior to their being able to experience it. 
(Seneca, Epistle 121.18-19) 
By apparently responding to philosophical discussions such as this one, Autobulus works closely within 
the argumentative parameters of Stoic arguments concerning animal rationality; and he even concedes 
a point made later on by Seneca, that the animal seeks to evade danger because it ‘senses that it is 
made of flesh’ (sentit – correlative with Greek αἴ σθησις), and ‘impulses’ (impetus – correlative with 
Greek ὁρμή) towards and away from objects occur naturally, or in accordance with ‘whatever nature 
prescribes’ (quidquid natura praecepit).42 Hence, Autobulus is reacting to a relativist notion of ‘nature’ 
that pervaded Stoic physics and philosophy of mind.  Consider, for example, the 2nd-Century CE Stoic 
Hierocles’ comments on the cognitive differences between animals and non-animals in his Elements of 
Ethics: 
One must therefore understand that, from this moment [sc. birth], an animal differs from a 
nonanimal in two respects, that is, in sensation (αἴ σθησις) and impulse (ὁρμή).  For the present, 
we do not need to discuss the latter, but it is necessary, I believe, to speak, at least briefly, about 
sensation.  For it contributes to a knowledge of the ‘first thing that is one’s own and familiar’ 
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(φέρει γὰρ εἰ ς γνῶσιν τοῦ πρώτου οἰ κείου), which is the subject that we in fact said would be the 
best starting point for the elements of ethics. 
(Hierocles the Stoic, Elements of Ethics Col. I.30-37; trans. by Konstan, with minor alterations)43 
In the subsequent section, Hierocles explains that animals perceive themselves as soon as they are 
born, by which he means that they perceive their own parts and the particular functions.44  And, similar 
to what we witnessed in Autobulus’ arguments, it is an animal’s nature (φύσις) that supplies them it 
certain capacities to defend themselves with what Hierocles refers to as its unique ‘inborn weapon’ 
(συμφυὲς ὅπλον).45  But non-animals, such as plants, possess such qualities as are imparted by nature, 
which include activities like growth and self-preservation; only animals (both rational and irrational) 
feature the so-called perceptive faculty (αἰ σθητική) that is peculiar to soul (ψυχή), which is marked by 
sensation and impulse; and only rational animals, i.e. human beings, possess reason (λόγος).46  Indeed, 
Hierocles goes so far as to assert that animals flee from and avoid humans ‘when they perceive our 
superiority in respect of reason’ (αἰ σθόμενον τῆς περὶ  τὸν λόγον ὑπεροχῆς).47  In an extended 
digression from his treatise On Marriage, Hierocles elaborates further on the many ways in which a 
creature’s nature can be thought to affect its approach to maximizing its advantage: 
Nature is a just teacher (δικαία δὲ διδάσκαλος ἡ φύσις), since, by the instruction that comes from 
her, there necessarily occurs a harmonious choice of duties.  In fact, each of the animals lives in a 
way that follows its own natural constitution: every plant, too, by Zeus, lives similarly in accord 
with what is called ‘living’ in their case, except that they do not make use of any reasoning or any 
calculation or choices based on things that are tested (πλὴν οὐκ ἐκλογισμῷ καὶ  ἀριθμήσει τινὶ  
χρώμενα καὶ  ταῖ ς ἀπὸ τῶν βασανιζομένων ἐκλογαῖ ς), but rather plants make use of bare nature 
– for they are without a share of soul – whereas animals make use both of representations that 
draw and of desires that drive them towards what is appropriate to them (φαντασίαις τε 
σπώσαις ἐπὶ  τὰ οἰ κεῖ α καὶ  ἐξελαυνούσαις προθυμίαις).  To us, nature gave reason (ἡμῖ ν δὲ ἡ 
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φύσις ἔδωκε τὸν λόγον) as well as all those other things, and along with all of them or rather in 
place of all of them, to see nature itself, so that, when our reason is intent on nature as on a 
target that is well lit and fixed, it chooses preferentially everything that is in harmony with nature 
and can make us live in the way one ought (καθηκόντως βιοῦντας ἡμᾶς ἀπεργάζοιτο). 
(Hierocles the Stoic, On Marriage F 2 = Stobaeus, Anthology 4.67.22; trans. by Konstan) 
What emerges from Hierocles’ arguments concerning nature is how closely it is tied to the general Stoic 
principle of oikeiôsis: living creatures pursue what is appropriate to them from birth.48  Animals perceive 
both the advantages that others have over them by nature, and the advantages they have over other 
animals, which are related to the peculiarity of their rational functions.49  For human beings, this means 
the natural bestowal of reason (λόγος), which makes it possible to live an ethically fulfilled life, one 
marked by the proper duties (καθηκόντως) that attend human experience.  Hence, according to 
Hierocles, reason’s function is to impel them towards human interactions, which make possible the 
successful management of the household – a step in the direction of acting after the manner of the 
gods.50 
 ‘Reason’ as a natural function thus facilitates, in Hierocles’ philosophy, imitation of god.  In the 
writings of Plutarch, however, there is a different goal in mind in the attempt to articulate the 
differentiae between various types of reasoning that animals are capable of.  Autobulus’ project, I 
suggest, is to subsume the sort of practical wisdom that differentiates human beings from other kinds 
of animals under a more widely expanded notion of λόγος, which will thereby, so I suggest, make it 
possible to conceive of a total equivalence between the animate and the rational.  Hence, Autobulus 
seems to commit here to the notion that the irrational part of an animal is not only the lower ‘part’ or 
‘parts’ of its soul, but rather that the irrational part of an animal is also its bodily parts, where, so it 
seems, αἴ σθησις or sensation takes place.51  As Plutarch says in On Moral Virtue: 
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Those who wonder how it is that the irrational exists, while being subservient to reason, do not 
seem to me to reflect upon the power of reason (ἡ δύναμις τοῦ λόγου), ‘how great it is by nature, 
and how far it penetrates’ [Eur. Fr. 898 Nauck] by way of mastering, and guiding with neither 
harsh nor inflexible methods (ἀντιτύποις ἀγωγαῖ ς), but by flexible (τυπικαῖ ς) ones, which are 
pliant and more efficacious at persuading than every sort of force and violence.  For, to be sure, 
breath, sinews, and bones, and the other parts of the body, are irrational, but whenever an 
impulse comes upon them – when reasoning (λογισμός) shakes the reigns, as it were – they grow 
taut, are drawn together, and obey. 
(Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 4, 442c-d) 
Plutarch’s ‘spectrum of rationality’ thus can be understood as a more general principle along the lines of 
what Socrates in the Republic treats as the virtue of justice (433b-d): reason or λόγος, at its most basic 
level in all animals, is the faculty that ranges across the entirety of the composite entity and that directs 
the irrational parts of the composite, which are its somatic elements (bones, sinews, breath, etc.), 
towards the final good assigned by nature upon birth.  Its tool is reasoning (λογισμός), which we earlier 
described as the faculty and activity of correct judgment: whenever an impulse is generated, reasoning, 
here understood to be sound, stirs the body into action – in this case the proper control of its parts.52  
Reason understands that, by nature, it is fitted to rule, and when the irrational parts of an organism 
yield in obeyance to reason’s directive, they also exhibit the virtue of justice.  Reason does not persuade 
the irrational parts through violence or force, but through flexible and persuasive means.53  In the 
passages that follow this one in On Moral Virtue, it is clear that Plutarch is thinking about human 
temperance, but he does not fail to address non-human animals in the light of these arguments either.  
Indeed, in a striking rhetorical move, he appropriates an anecdote concerning the founder of Stoicism, 
Zeno of Citium, to justify his own conceptualization of animal rationality: 
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Moreover, they say that even Zeno, when he was on his way to the theater and Amoebus was 
singing to the kithara, said to his pupils: “Let us go and observe well what melody and sound gut 
and sinew, wood and bone, send forth when they share of reason, number, and order” [SVF 1.67]. 
 But, leaving these things to the side, I would gladly learn from them [sc. Plutarch’s Stoic 
opponents] whether, when they observe dogs, horses, and domestic birds – through habituation, 
rearing, and teaching – putting forward understandable sounds (φωνὰς συνετὰς) and postures 
and movements that render obedience to reason (πρὸς λόγον ὑπηκόους κινήσεις καὶ  σχέσεις 
ἀποδιδόντας), and engaging in activities that reflect due measure and advantage for us; and 
when they hear Homer saying of Achilles that 
 ‘he goaded both horses and men’ [adapt. Hom. Il. 16.167]  
into action – [I would gladly learn from them] whether they still wonder and doubt that what is 
spirited in us, and what is appetitive, which experiences both pleasure and pain, by nature obeys 
what is intelligent, is affected by it, and dwells with it (ὑπακούειν τε τῷ φρονοῦντι καὶ  πάσχειν 
ὑπ᾽  αὐτοῦ καὶ  συνδιατίθεσθαι πέφυκεν); nor does it depart from it, nor yet is it shaped nor 
moulded, nor imprinted by any sorts of force or blows, from the outside, but, by nature, [what is 
spirited in us, and what is appetitive] depends upon [what is intelligent] and is always associating 
with it and cultivated together with it and is brought to completion through acquaintance with it. 
(Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 4, 443a-c) 
According to Plutarch, then, even the Stoic paterfamilias Zeno understood that the irrational parts of a 
composite entity – in this case, a lyre – which themselves are not only objects found in nature, but once 
had been parts of animals as well, are able to produce sweet melody and sound because they have been 
given proper tuning, according to ‘reason, number, and order’.  The implication is that all absolute 
irrational objects, i.e. objects that do not have any soul at all, still possess the capacity to, in a certain 
sense, ‘sing’; similarly, so Plutarch suggests, rational animals such as horses and birds that have been 
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trained properly through ‘habituation, rearing, and teaching’, are able to produce sounds that are 
comprehensible (συνετάς)54: comprehensible not by virtue of obtaining ‘wisdom’, in the sense of 
contemplating absolutes; nor of facilitating discursive communication between human and non-human 
animals (it’s not like parrots and humans can conduct intelligent conversations about the form of the 
table); but comprehensible only insofar as they reflect the proper ordered arrangements in the universe 
and the perfection of nature when reason directs.55  It may be that the Stoics were right to point out 
that nature teaches all animals to seek self-preservation and to recognize their inborn faculties; but for 
Plutarch, reason, optimally represented by the human being who seeks godlikeness, is what trains the 
irrational to fall in line with the total rationality of the universe. 
 What is the upshot of the first part of our study?  Plutarch’s presentation of the soul and its 
rationalizing functions in his treatise On Moral Virtue, when brought to bear on Autobulus’ arguments 
for animal rationality in the dialogue Whether Land or Sea Animals are Smarter, forces us to consider 
whether the notion that non-human animal ‘sagacity’ (σύνεσις), which we postponed discussing until 
this point in our argument, operates at a far lower level within the spectrum of rationality than scholars 
such as Newmyer are suggesting, in their attempt to rescue Plutarch’s views for contemporary 
philosophy.56  The attributes of reason that Plutarch assigns to non-human animals are, in all cases 
mentioned here, much more pragmatic and utilitarian than anything like assigning to non-human 
animals a level of cognition and rationality on par with humans.57  For Plutarch, the virtue that non-
human animals can obtain is justice, which Socrates in the Republic (433b-d) had hypothesized to be the 
notion that each part of a community should identify the activity proper to it and pursue that activity 
alone.58  The general point reiterated throughout the evidence surveyed above is that non-human 
animals participate in reason and sagacity in a qualified way, one that reflects the limits of their rational 
capacities while at the same time secures their communion with the rationality that unites the many 
parts of the universe.59  If this is a plausible reading of Plutarch’s views on animal rationality and moral 
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psychology, then our assessment of other works in Plutarch’s corpus that illustrate human and non-
human animal interaction would need to account for it.  Hence, we turn in the second part of this article 
to Plutarch’s On the Fact that Irrational Animals Employ Logos or, as it is commonly known, Gryllus.  In 
the light of what we have previously argued about animal rationality and virtue in Plutarch’s treatises 
dedicated to those subjects, how are we to interpret the philosophical debate staged between a talking 
pig named Gryllus (‘Oinker’)60, once one of Odysseus’ men61 who was transformed into a pig by Circe, 
and Odysseus, who has returned to take his beast-men back home to Ithaca?  Are we to follow 
Newmyer in taking seriously the claims of Gryllus, which center around the basic assumption that 
irrational animals, such as pigs, are superior to humans because of their proclivity to virtue in 
accordance with nature?62  Or are we to side instead with Lucas Herchenroeder and David Konstan in 
seeing an active element of farce or parody here?63  Or is there some middle way here?  In order to 
advance upon these questions, I will first investigate the philosophical position put forward by Gryllus, 
which, as I will argue, is broadly Epicurean in content, and then turn to assessment of his views 
concerning animal rationality in the context of the philosophical polemic between Plutarch and 
Epicureanism. 
 
GRYLLUS: A PLATONIST HUMAN DEBATES AN EPICUREAN PIG  
 
 Plutarch’s dialogue Gryllus begins in medias res, with Odysseus visiting Circe and requesting the 
return of his men, who have been turned into non-human animals (1, 985d-e).  Circe explains that 
Odysseus will be able to take them away if he can convince them through disputation (1, 986a).  
Odysseus takes this as mockery: how, he says, will it be possible for him to conduct a dispute with them 
‘so long as they are asses and dogs and lions’ (1, 986b)?  Circe promises to render them – or at least one 
of them (Gryllus) – ‘conscious and responsive’ (συνιέντας καὶ  διαλεγομένους), i.e. she will bring 
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forward one who has some ‘sagacity’ (σύνεσις) and is capable of philosophical dialectic (διαλέγεσθαι) in 
order to represent the other animals (ibid.).64  She excuses herself, and Odysseus begins by explaining 
to Gryllus that he’d like to restore to their original shape (εἰ ς τὸ ἀρχαῖ ον εἶ δος)65 any of the animals 
that had formerly been his men who would prefer it (2, 986c).  But he is immediately interrupted by 
Gryllus, who charges Odysseus with arrogance and being afraid of change: 
Gryllus: ‘Hold on, Odysseus, don’t say anything more!  You see, all of us look down upon you just 
as you do us; you see, that talk of you as clever is empty, as is your reputation for far surpassing 
others in practical reasoning (τῷ φρονεῖ ν), you who tremble at this very thing – changing from 
worse to better – because you haven’t investigated it.  For, just as children are afraid of the drugs 
of doctors and avoid the suffering (τὰ παθήματα φεύγουσιν), so too you have shied away from 
becoming one thing from another (τὸ ἄλλος ἐξ ἄλλου γενέσθαι), and you yourself shudder 
(φρίττων) and cower (ὑποδειμαίνων) in the presence of Circe, [fearing] lest she give you the slip 
and turn you into a pig or wolf, while also persuading us, we who live among an abundance of 
goods, to sail away with you – abandoning them, and along with them she who makes provision 
of them by becoming men once again, the most unfortunate animal of all. 
(Plutarch, On the Fact that Irrational Animals Employ Logos 2, 986c-d) 
A topical and terminological analysis of this passage confirms what David Konstan has suggested, 
namely that Gryllus’ arguments exhibit an adherence to Epicurean concepts66: the argument that 
children should overcome their fear of affections or suffering and take the drugs offered by doctors in 
order to become healthy is famously paralleled in Lucretius’ On the Nature of Things  (1.936-43 = 4.11-
18)67; and the fear of becoming something other than what one is – in this case, changing one’s species 
from human to non-human animal – is a specific reflection upon a worry that contributed, for the 
Epicureans, to a disrupted psychological state, that is, loss of identity (which, in the most extreme case, 
is death).  Death is nothing to us, as Lucretius notes (adapting Epicurus’ Kuria Doxa 2), because ‘we’ 
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cease to exist (3.838-42), and hence notions of the persistence of identity beyond death implied by 
transmigration are absurd and encourage disturbance of the mind.68  Gryllus’ language, too, is distinctly 
Epicurean: the term φρίσσω appears to be something of a signature term in Epicurean ethics, being 
used in reference to the notion of ‘shuddering at death’ in Philodemus69 and ‘shuddering at the 
decomposition of the body’ in Diogenes of Oenoanda.70  It usually implies a kind of reflex reaction, 
sometimes indicating the (mistaken) fear of a divine benefactor.71  Similarly, Epicurus (if he is actually 
the author of this quotation)72 notes that the argument (logos) of a philosopher is vain (kenos) if it does 
not heal the suffering of a human being, as ‘just as there is no benefit in medicine if it does not expel the 
illnesses of bodies, so too there is no benefit in philosophy if it does not expel the affection of the 
soul’.73  So, from the outset of the dialogue, we are prompted to expect from Gryllus an Epicureanizing 
argument for why changing from one body into another is a good thing, and for why being returned to 
one’s ‘original form’ is an ethically compromised wish – an ‘empty argument’ or, as Gryllus later holds in 
the dialogue, an ‘empty opinion’ (κενὴ δοξή), in a passage that differentiates, along Epicurean lines, 
natural from extrinsic desires: 
Temperance (σωφροσύνη), then, is a kind of scantiness and ordering of the desires that 
eliminates those that are extraneous and superfluous, and arranges those that are necessary by 
proper timing and measurement.74  You can, I suppose, observe countless differences in the 
desires…and the desire to eat and drink, at the same time as being natural, is necessary.75  But 
the pleasures of love – the ones which nature furnishes with principles and which we are capable 
of not employing and even ridding ourselves of sufficiently – have been referred to as ‘natural and 
unnecessary’.  But the kind of desires of yours that are neither natural nor necessary, but that 
flow in from the outside because the ignorance of what is beautiful attendant to kenodoxia 
(‘empty opinion’), all but obscures all the natural desires under its multitude; it is just like an alien 
mob invading the demos, overpowering the native citizens.76  But beasts have souls that are in 
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every way impassive and unfrequented of incurring affections, and they conduct their lives far 
from kenodoxia (empty opinion) as if they dwelt far from the sea.   
(Plutarch, On the Fact that Irrational Animals Employ Logos 6, 989b-d) 
As Konstan has noted, Gryllus’ argument for animal temperance is rooted in the Epicurean classification 
of emotions as natural, natural but unnecessary, and external, as evidenced in the Kuriai Doxai.77  
Similarly, the notion that human kenodoxia becomes operative in the case of unnecessary and 
unnatural desires is attested for Epicurean philosophy.78  But Gryllus’ argument, writ large, is derived 
from a more universal set of claims found in Hellenistic philosophy in support of autarchy, or the 
principle of ethical and political self-sufficiency.79  We cannot lose sight of the fact that Gryllus’ praise of 
emotional self-sufficiency is figured in geopolitical terms: the beast who is able to fend off invading 
external affections is like someone who lives far from the corrupting sea, whereas Odysseus is the 
seafarer par excellence, the paradigmatic emblem of nautical wandering who, in spite of all his 
cleverness, is ever in search of the peace of mind that attends the stability of the home.  
 If it is well established that Gryllus represents an Epicurean philosophical position, however 
qualified by a certain peculiar vitriol, are we to infer that Plutarch is presenting the pig as an object of 
simple parody?  On the contrary, I do believe that it is possible to overstate Plutarch’s polemic against 
Epicureanism in the Gryllus.  I tend instead to agree with Patricia Fitzgibbon, who has written on 
Plutarch’s treatment of Epicureans Boethus and Cassius in the Lives, that Plutarch tends to represent 
Epicurean philosophy as a reputable, but ultimately deficient, form of philosophy, whose practitioners 
have something to contribute to philosophical inquiry – if and only if they can get beyond their 
proclivity towards ad hominem attack and pettiness, and, importantly, their delusions regarding 
theology.80  Indeed, there are, as Newmyer has correctly noted, some striking similarities between the 
philosophical positions on animal rationality illustrated in On Moral Virtue and Whether Land or Sea 
Animals are Smarter, as discussed in the first part of this paper, and the arguments of Gryllus the pig.81  
22 
 
Let’s consider Gryllus’ assessment of the ‘practical wisdom of beasts’ (ἡ τῶν θερίων φρόνησις).  After 
listing many examples of how animals instinctually seek modes of self-preservation through their 
inborn ‘art’ (991d-e) not dissimilar to Seneca’s claims, Gryllus explains what distinguishes ‘the practical 
wisdom of beasts’: 
For if you speak the truth and say that nature is the teacher of these [arts], you are 
 referring the practical wisdom of beasts to the most authoritative and wisest principle.  If you 
do not think it is appropriate to refer to this as ‘reason’ (λόγος) or ‘practical intelligence’ 
(φρόνησις), it’s high time to pursue a name for it that is fairer and more honorable 
(τιμιώτερον)82, just as it doubtless confers a capacity that is better and more astonishing through 
its works.   It is no uneducated or untrained faculty, but rather one self-taught and self-sufficient; 
and, not because of feebleness, but due to the strength and perfection of the virtue that exists 
according to nature, it gives leave to the contributions to practical reasoning through education 
conferred by others.  At any rate, the thinking (διανοία) of such beasts as those that humans 
induce to education and training through rearing and play grasps what they are taught even 
when it is contrary to the nature of their body, thanks to the excellence of their sagacity 
(σύνεσις). 
(Plutarch, On the Fact that Irrational Animals Employ Logos 9, 991e-992a) 
Subsequent to this passage, Gryllus provides a litany of animals which learn to control their bodies 
through learning that occurs either from human masters or from their own parents (992a-c).  There is a 
most unfortunate lacuna, before Gryllus concludes this section by saying that he marvels at the 
arguments of those who consider all animals irrational and unintelligent (ἄλογα καὶ  ἀνόητα) except 
mankind (probably referring specifically to the Stoics here83, although possibly to some Epicurean 
positions as well, such as that of Epicurus’ successor Hemarchus, who denied that humans could not 
enter into compacts of justice with animals because the latter were irrational).84 
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 Interestingly, with the exception of the fact that Gryllus attributes to nature the origin of animal 
practical intelligence85 – a position that is perhaps most succinctly expressed in a line from Lucretius’On 
the Nature of Things (5.1033: ‘For each [animal] perceives to what purpose it is able to employ its 
peculiar capacities’) – nothing in this passage departs very far from Autobulus’ and Plutarch’s theories 
of animal psychology, as described earlier in this paper.  Indeed, up to this point in the dialogue, 
Plutarch’s Epicurean interlocutor Gryllus advances positions on animal rationality that parallel what 
Plutarch had said in On Moral Virtue and what his son Autobulus said in Whether Land or Sea Animals are 
Smarter.  Gryllus has also, pace Newmyer, retained use of terminology from the Platonist philosophy of 
mind, even despite his commitment, especially in the area of ethics, to Epicurean concepts and 
sentiments.86  Recall Plutarch’s differentiation of the two parts of λόγος in On Moral Virtue 5 (443d-
444a): σοφία or ‘wisdom’ is first philosophy or theology (in an Aristotelian sense), which for Plutarch 
contemplates absolutes, whereas φρόνησις or ‘practical wisdom’ occurs when the contemplative 
rational mode ‘is attendant to and arranged towards the practical and emotive’, with the object of its 
reasoning directed towards things that are contingent and subject to chance: as we saw above, 
φρόνησις is the kind of knowledge that deals with ‘good and bad, things to be desired and things to be 
avoided, what is pleasurable and what is painful.’87  This definition is an apparent elaboration of 
Epicurus’ definition of prudentia/φρόνησις, according to Cicero (On Duties 3.118 = F 514 Usener), as 
‘knowledge that supplies pleasures and expels pains (scientiam suppeditantem voluptates, depellentem 
dolores), although Plutarch himself rejects the Epicurean axiom that φρόνησις is superior to first 
philosophy.88  So, from this perspective, everything Gryllus is arguing is of a piece with Plutarch’s 
descriptions elsewhere of φρόνησις, or the lower form of reasoning that obtains its significance on the 
spectrum of rationality with the objects of the world relative to us, those things that are subject to 
chance, including ethics.  Gryllus’ arguments have some force, and they represent the nuanced 
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articulation of the value of the lower of the two parts on the spectrum of rationality, φρόνησις, whose 
importance for animal life lies in its value for conducting affairs in the world down here. 
 If Plutarch does indeed believe that non-human animals are capable of practical wisdom, then 
Gryllus’ arguments end up bearing out, and further explicating, an important claim made by Autobulus 
in On Moral Virtue concerning the activities nature undertakes:  ‘nature...does everything for the sake of 
something (ἕνεκά του) and relative to something (πρός τι)’.89  Gryllus’ statements boil down to 
arguments for philosophical action, being committed to a final cause that is located within the world of 
contingency around us.90  We will, of course, recall that the Epicureans were famous throughout the 
Roman world for their philosophical approach to ethics, which understood proper ethical ideals, 
especially ataraxia (or the freedom from states of trouble), to be grounded in the natural world.  It 
seems to me that philosophers of other Hellenistic and Post-Hellenistic philosophical schools, such as 
the Stoics, Peripatetics, Middle Platonists, and Pythagoreans, wouldn’t have found much to quibble 
with Gryllus on this basic point; and Gryllus’ discourse on the virtues, which bears many Platonic 
qualities as well, is not terribly heterodox within the philosophical environment of the 1st Centuries BCE-
CE, when all philosophical schools took what they wanted from Plato, Aristotle, and the scholarchs of 
the Academy and the Lyceum.  What did separate the Stoics, Peripatetics, Middle Platonists, and 
Pythagoreans from their Epicurean competitors – and this is a crucial point of difference that Plutarch 
himself recognizes – was the former’s commitment to the knowability and accessibility of god.91  
Indeed, Plutarch’s criticisms of Epicurean theological epistemology are borne out in his description of 
non-human animal rationality in his Reply to Colotes (30, 1125a): ‘Indeed, the way of life of beasts is as it 
is because they have no knowledge of anything (οὐδὲν ἐπίσταται) finer than pleasure, neither knowing 
the justice of the gods (οὐδὲ δίκην θεῶν) nor yet paying reverence (σέβεται) to the beauty of virtue.’ 
And, remarkably, this is precisely the topic to which the Gryllus turns in the final surviving lines of the 
dialogue: 
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ODYSSEUS: ‘Look, Gryllus, is it not terrible and violent to grant reason to those in whom there is 
no inherent knowledge of god (ἀπολιπεῖ ν λόγον οἷ ς οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται θεοῦ νόησις)?’ 
GRYLLUS: ‘Are we to deny, then, Odysseus, that so wise and remarkable (σοφὸν οὕτως ὄντα καὶ  
περιττὸν) a man as you descended from Sisyphus?’ 
(Plutarch, On the Fact that Irrational Beasts Employ Logos 9, 992e) 
As is well known, a sufficient reading of the dialogue requires us to deal with this enigmatic (apparent) 
conclusion.  After conceding the points that Gryllus has raised regarding the capacity of non-human 
animals to engage in practical reasoning, Odysseus challenges the pig to state how it could be possible 
to assign reason (λόγος) to non-human animals if they do not know god inherently.92    For Middle 
Platonists, knowledge of god is knowledge of the highest absolute, that which in no way is contingent 
on, or posterior to, anything else in the universe.93  Note, for example, how Plutarch has employed the 
term νόησις – the first and only time we have seen it used in the dialogue. Νόησις is a ‘technical term’ of 
sorts for Platonists, being reserved for the highest level on Plato’s own spectrum of rationality, as most 
famously developed in the divided line passage of the Republic (509d1-511e4).94 There, the objects of its 
contemplation are the forms and, especially, the form of the Good, that to which all things reduce, and 
which all things imitate.  Epistemically, νόησις is the rational activity that belongs to the intelligible 
realm (τὸ νοητόν), where nothing is corporeal or contingent, and everything is true.95  In Alcinous, 
νόησις is marked by three activities, all of which make tenable the knowledge of higher concepts: 
abstraction, analogizing, and induction.96 Similarly, for Plutarch in the Platonic Questions (III, 1001e-f), 
νόησις occurs through abstraction of the qualities that link the various mathematical sciences described 
in Republic 525b-531d, an activity that Plutarch qualifies as the ‘lopping away of body’ (περικοπῆς 
σώματος).97 
 Gryllus’ scathing response to Odysseus’ Platonist orthodoxy adapts a tradition which makes 
Odysseus the bastard child of Sisyphus (the story goes that Sisyphus impregnated Anticlea before she 
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married Laertes)98, and it shows once again the pig’s spiteful intentions and penchant for the dramatic 
in presenting his philosophical views.  What is the meaning of the insult, labelling Odysseus the wise 
man bastard son of the wise Sisyphus?  It is unclear whether the Gryllus ends with these words, or 
whether the manuscript continued on, with further discussion of the ‘natural virtue’ implied in section 9, 
or possibly a more elaborate discussion of justice.  Be that as it may, what is clear is that the insult 
derives its philosophical import from the so-called Sisyphus Fragment, which was attributed in 
antiquity to Euripides, may have been composed by Plato’s uncle Critias, and held special value for 
Epicureans.99  There, we see that Sisyphus imagines that the gods were invented by a ‘certain 
remarkable and wise man’ (πυκνός τις καὶ  σοφός)100 for the purpose of curbing lawless behavior, as a 
sort of ‘conscience’ that would keep an eye on people when they were planning bad deeds in secret.  
Sisyphus places a significant amount of emphasis on a manufactured ‘fear’ of the gods as the 
mechanism for social control, and the links to the natural world, especially the upper part of the sphere 
where meteorological phenomena such as lightning and thunder occur, are explicit; hence, it is easy to 
see how Epicureans might have found in the Sisyphus fragment a precursor of their own views. From 
this perspective, Gryllus’ response to Odysseus’ challenge is perfectly in line with his Epicureanism: how 
could the son of Sisyphus, who elaborates an evolutionary theory of the gods deeply compatible with 
that of the Epicureans, speak about knowledge of god as if it were a given for human beings?  The 
dialogue appears to end there, at precisely the moment when the discussion of animal λόγος has been 
brought to the fore. It concludes with an insult and an apparent impasse: Epicureans simply will not 
concede that the gods, as they are conceived by humans, are anything other than a (particular sort of 
material) fiction, and the fear of the gods is a fundamental epistemic and moral mistake, since it leads 
to all sorts of unhappinesses in life and confusions in understanding; and Platonists will simply not 
concede that the practical knowledge of which non-human animals have a share is anything more than 
knowledge pertinent to matters below, in the world of chance and contingency, that has no bearing on 
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σοφία, knowledge of things like forms and other absolutes, the highest hypostasis of which is god-
knowledge.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 In order to address the apparent impasse between Platonist and Epicurean that apparently 
closes the Gryllus, I want to return to a wide and inclusive notion of ‘reason’ or λόγος in the writings of 
Plutarch.  As Herchenroeder has noted (and emphasized in the title of his 2008 article), one of the 
fundamental questions of the Gryllus is posed near the beginning, by Circe (2, 986b): ‘what does this 
have to do with λόγος’ (τί γὰρ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸν λόγον)?101  What to do indeed.  It has become clear from 
our analysis of Plutarch’s Gryllus in the context of his treatise On Moral Virtue that Plutarch’s porcine 
interlocutor both expresses Epicurean sentiments regarding the proper approach to living one’s life, in 
accordance with Epicurean precepts, and adopts the spectral model of animal rationality elaborated by 
Plutarch himself elsewhere in his treatises and other dialogues.  The Gryllus presents positive 
contributions to the question of animal rationality from both traditions: the Epicureans develop an 
account of natural virtue in practical wisdom that can extend lower forms of reason to non-human 
animals, and the Platonists contribute to our understanding of wisdom as first philosophy, the study of 
absolute first principles that must underlie our knowledge of the reality of things in order for knowledge 
to be even possible.  In a way – and this is the main point of my argument – Plutarch’s spectrum of 
rationality is (and must be, if it is to be philosophically consistent) sufficient to accommodate both the 
Epicurean and the Platonist positions: Epicureans have something to contribute to our understanding 
of virtue and its applications both among non-human and human animals, especially with regard to the 
appropriate management of emotions, whereas Platonists provide a sufficient framework for higher-
level grasping of first principles and causation and, ultimately, the prime mover himself.   Plutarch’s 
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inclusive and expansive notion of logos thus accommodates even competitor philosophical positions 
with regard to animal rationality, and the spectrum of rationality – a somewhat playful modification 
and expansion of Plato’s image of the divided line – becomes the ultimate model for a philosophical 
paradigm that, properly configured, indicates the totality of λόγος across the entire universe, in all 
areas where λόγος can be thought to hold sway.  This, I think, is what scholars really mean when they 
speak – usually pejoratively – about Plutarch as an ‘eclectic’ philosopher: Plutarch attempts to account 
for all the possible modes of wisdom that are available to us and subscribe them under a universal 
model of reason.  Even pigs like Gryllus get it. 
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1
 See Newmyer 2006: 3. Much of his discussion of Plutarch’s animal psychology comes in Chapter 2: ‘The Nature 
of the Beast’, which builds on Newmyer 1999.  Also see, more recently, Steiner 2008: 42-43 and, more 
persuasively, Bouffartigue 2012: xxx-xxxv. 
2
 Sorabji 1993. 
3
 Especially Becchi 2000. 
4
 See Newmyer 2006: 3, where he expressly notes, ‘it would be erroneous and anachronistic to maintain that any 
ancient philosopher held a position that could justifiably be termed “animal rightist”’. 
5
 Newmyer 2006: 3-4. 
6
 Newmyer 2006: 6. 
7
 Newmyer 2006: 8. 
8
 Steiner (2008: 42-43) shows nuance by recognizing that Plutarch does not believe, as apparently Chrysippus did, 
that dogs are capable of syllogistic logic.  But he resorts specious biographical explanation in order to account for 
apparent discrepancies in Plutarch’s account of animal rationality and rights (2008: 120).  
9
 I use the term ‘spectrum’ because of its etymological covalence in Latin with the verb spectere, which indicates 
the applied perceptual activity of contemplare (Greek θεωρέω) to a specific range of objects, e.g., in Scipio’s dream 
(Cic. Resp. 6.20): ‘Sentio, inquit, te sedem etiam nunc hominum ac domum contemplari; quae si tibi parva, ut est, ita 
videtur, haec caelestia semper spectato, illa humana contemnito’.  Numerous other examples present from across 
the philosophical schools of the Hellenistic and Post-Hellenistic worlds indicate the wide range of such an 
application in spectare (Cic. Tusc. 5.71; Lucr. 2.289 and 5.958; Curt. 8.9.33; Vitr. 1.4.1). For a terminological 
equivalence in Plutarch’s own work, see below where I discuss the λόγος θεωρῶν. On philosophical θεωρία more 
generally, see Nightingale 2004 and the essays collected in Bénatouil and Bonazzi 2012. 
10
 Scholars have more recently begun to take seriously the project of ‘unifying’ Plutarch’s corpus; see more 
generally the collection of essays edited by Nikolaidis (2008), and especially Castelnérac’s contribution to that 
volume. 
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11
 Newmyer cites this text once in his 2006 monograph (p. 18), and only to describe human psychology.  The most 
recent textual edition and translation of Whether Land or Sea Animals are Smarter is Bouffartigue 2012. 
12
 Also II.8, not related to symposiastic behaviour.   
13
 Plut. Soll. an. 7, 964e. 
14
 We hear that Autobulus’ son is also ‘the ἑταῖ ρος of Soclarus’, but such a designation need not refer to Plutarch 
as such.  Indeed, Soclarus is an advocate for Plutarch’s sons (including Autobulus) at Table-Talk VIII.6, 726a. 
15
 Bouffartigue (2012: xiv-xv) assumes that Plutarch’s son is the speaker, without considering the possibility of his 
father. 
16
 That he was prone to disputation is also suggested by VIII.2, 719c. 
17
 Compare, in Whether Land or Sea Animals are Smarter (959f), Autobulus’ citation of the ‘Pythagoreans’ as 
people who treated animal gently ‘with an eye to humaneness and pity’ (πρὸς τὸ φιλάνθρωπον καὶ  
φιλοίκτιρμον). 
18
 Democritus, in particular (DK 68 B 183), associates ξύνεσις with practical reasoning (φρονεῖ ν) and (B 77) with 
the obtaining of secure possessions (ἀσφαλέα κτήματα). Also compare Aristotle’s account in his History of 
Animals (VIII.1, 588a23-29), where he speaks of non-human animals not as having capacities that are the same 
(but to a lesser degree) as those of humans, but ‘analogous’ (ὡς...οῦτῶς), including ‘knowledge, wisdom, and 
sagacity’ (τέχνη καὶ  σοφία καὶ  σύνεσις). 
19
 References to ‘yesterday’s’ dialogue need not refer to a lost work of Plutarch’s, as we know of at least one 
dialogue, Philo’s On the Reason which even Brute Animals Possess or Alexander (written perhaps a half-a-century 
prior to Plutarch’s works, and only preserved in Armenian translation), in which Philo’s nephew Tiberius Julius 
Alexander presented arguments similar to those described in Autobulus’ summary of ‘yesterday’s’ discussion.  
Hence, it may be that Plutarch assumes dialogues such as that of Philo which have been lost to us.  See the 
editions and translations of Abraham Terian (into English, 1981; and into French, 1988). 
20
 All translations from Greek or Latin are mine, except where noted. 
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21
 This relatively unusual word occurs, among philosophical contexts, in the context of human beings sharing in 
(μετέχειν) justice in Protagoras’ speech (Pl. Prt. 323c2), but its use by Epicurus is also marked by the 2
nd
 Century 
CE grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus (F 607 Usener), where it is said to mean κατά τινα τρόπον. 
22
 Bouffartigue (2012: 4) does not commit to specific cognitive operations, translating into, respectively, ‘pensée’, 
‘raisonnement’, and ‘entendement’. 
23
 See especially Alcin. Didask. 155.13-32.  By attributing διανοία to all animals, Autobulus appears to be 
presenting what was, in Plutarch’s time, a traditional Platonist view, as represented by Philo’s nephew Alexander 
in the former’s de Animalibus 17, only preserved in Armenian. 
24
 It is of course ontologically posterior to pure intellection (νόησις).   
25
 Plut. De virtute morali 7,448b: οὐ γέγονε κρίσις ἀλλ’ ἀπορία, στάσις οὖσα καὶ  μονὴ διανοίας ὑπ’ ἐναντίων 
πιθανῶν.  Note that Plutarch here is correcting the insufficient Stoic account of the soul’s intellectual action, which 
he has earlier characterized as equivocating διανοία with the ἡγεμονικόν (3, 441c = SVF III.459).  Generally, on 
Plutarch’s moral psychology in De Virtute Morali and its Platonic antecedents, see Opsomer 2012: 321-326. 
26
 Plut. De virtute morali 7,448a-c: ‘Hence, reasoning, whenever the truth is manifest, dismissing what is false 
gladly inclines towards it.’  As an intellective activity, λογισμός is divine (10, 450e). 
27
 Similarly in Animine an corporis affectiones sint peiores 2, 500e, Plutarch argues that λογισμός, ‘when sound, 
perceives the diseases that affect the body; but when it is itself afflicted with the diseases of the soul, it can form 
no judgment in the midst of the things that it is suffering, for its suffering occurs in the part by which makes 
judgments.’ 
28
 Compare Plut. De virtute morali 6, 446a.   Note that this view is similar to one that Cicero’s metaphysician, 
Varro, criticizes in his Academica (1.30-32), on which see Boys-Stones 2012: 221-228.  Is Plutarch adapting and 
appropriating a Stoic view on the kriterion? 
29
 Accepting Hembold’s correction for mss. ἀμφοῖ ν δὲ τοῦ λόγου θεωρητικοῦ ὄντος, which cannot make sense 
given the subsequent division of the genus ‘contemplative’ into the species ‘contemplative’ and ‘practical’ (as 
noted by Bernardakis; Becchi surprisingly does not acknowledge this problem in his edition).  Interestingly, Philo 
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too, in his De animalibus, divides λόγος by its two applications: λόγος προφορικός and λόγος ἐνδιάθετος (on 
which see Terian 1988: 60-62).  Elsewhere, Plutarch refers to this as the κοινὸς λόγος (see the next note). 
30
 Compare Plutarch’s account of the world-soul’s faculties (De an. procr. 26, 1025e, trans. Cherniss): ‘Now, as the 
soul is at once contemplative and practical, and contemplates the universals but acts upon the particulars, and 
apparently cognizes the former but perceives the latter, the reason common to both (ὁ κοινὸς λόγος), as it is 
continually coming upon the difference in sameness and upon sameness in difference, tries with definitions and 
divisions to separate the one and the many, that is the indivisible and the divisible, but cannot arrive at either 
exclusively, because the very principles have been intermixed with each other.’  On the Platonist bicategorical 
division of absolute from relative, see inter alia Krämer 1972: 75-96. 
31
 Plutarch adopts a differentiation between σοφία and φρόνησις that is thought ultimately to trace back to the 
sixth book of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (EN VI.12-13, 1143b18-1145a11; for one comprehensive analysis, see 
Engberg-Pederson 1983: 96-104).  I do not wish to engage in the debate about the peculiarities of Aristotle’s 
differentiation, but would point the reader to some questions raised by Long 2011: 103-105.  It is notable, and 
often overlooked, that the Early Platonist Xenocrates, whose influence over Plutarch is implied in his treatment of 
him (see Karamanolis 2006: 103-105), differentiated these terms quite clearly, according to Clement of Alexandria 
(2.5 = F 177 IP²): ‘Xenocrates, too, in his work On Phronesis, says that wisdom (σοφία) is the knowledge of the 
primary causes and of the intelligible being, whereas he believes that φρόνησις, which is, in fact, a human sort of 
wisdom, is bifurcated into the practical and theoretical.  Therefore wisdom is φρόνησις, although not all φρόνησις 
is wisdom.’  As we will see later in this paper, the description of φρόνησις offered by Plutarch here is an 
elaboration of an Epicurean definition. 
32
 Compare Poseidonus’ general description of the end as ‘to live contemplating the truth and order of all things 
together and helping in promoting it as far as possible, in no way being led by the irrational part of the soul’ (Clem. 
Stromat. II.21 = F 186 Kidd; trans. Kidd). 
33
 Compare Iamblichus’ analysis (Protr. IV, pp. 20.15-21.13 Pistelli) of pseudo-Archytas’ treatise On Wisdom (on 
which, see Horky 2016: 29-31): ‘“The human has been born and constituted for the purpose of contemplating the 
reason of the nature of the universe; and, therefore, it is the function of wisdom to <obtain> and contemplate the 
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intelligence of the things that are (F 3 = p. 44.17-20 Thesleff).”’ …In the same way, [Archytas] tries to urge us on to 
both practical and theoretical philosophy. For the acquisition of intelligence of something productive is a function 
too of practical virtue, the end of which is not simply beholding how it is, but apprehending it through its 
activities.’ 
34
 Plutarch understands that the world-soul has in itself its affective cause (De an. procr. 27, 1026e; also see 28, 
1027a), whereas the human soul obtains its irrational emotions from the body it is mixed with (De virtute morali 11, 
451a-b).  Hence, there is not a simple equivocation between cosmic and human psychology (as assumed by 
Karamanolis 2014).  Better is Opsomer’s attempts to detect analogies in these relationships (1994: 159; 1998: 159 
n. 149; and especially 2012: 313-315), although I’m not quite sure that I can agree that the world-soul and human 
soul, qua animal, are exactly ‘isomorphic’ (1998: 205 n. 370); also see Baltes 2000: 265-266.  
35
 Compare the mysterious voice that spoke to Timarchus (according to Simmias) in Plutarch’s On the Daimonion 
of Socrates (591d-e): ‘Every soul partakes of intellect, and none is irrational and unintelligent, but to the extent to 
which it mixes with flesh and affections, it, in its pleasures and pains, is turned into something irrational through 
alteration.  But not every soul mixes in the same way: some sink entirely into a body, and, becoming disrupted 
throughout, are in their life completely distracted by affections; but others mingle [only] in some way, but in 
another way leave outside what is purest [sc. the daemon]…thus, Timarchus, understand that when you look 
upon the stars that seem to be extinguished, you are seeing souls that sink entirely into the body, and that when 
you look upon the starts that are lighted again, as it were, and become apparent again from below, you are seeing 
souls that float back from bodies after death, shaking off a sort of dimness and darkness as one might shake off 
mud.’   
36
 Plut. Soll. an. 2, 960b-c. 
37
 Cf. Bouffartigue (2012: 6), who translates ‘reconnaître’.  
38
 See Alex. Aphr. De fato 11, p. 25.4-6 Thillet = SVF II.1140. 
39
 The literature is of course vast on this subject.  One might, however, see the discussion of final cause as ‘that for 
the sake of which’ in Johnson 2005: 82-85. 
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40
 It is difficult to find direct comparanda for Plutarch’s statement, but the division into absolutes and relatives is 
generally Platonist (see, e.g., Diogenes Laertius’ account of Plato’s division of beings at D.L. III. 108-109) and is 
attested for Hermodorus of Syracuse (in a unique format: καθ’ αὑτά and πρὸς ἕτερα, which is further subdivided 
into πρὸς ἐναντία and πρός τι: F 5 IP²); Xenocrates of Chalcedon and Antiochus of Ascalon (καθ’αὐτό and πρός τι: 
F 15 IP²); Eudorus of Alexandria (T 15 Mazzarelli, where he praises Aristotle for acknowledging the division into 
καθ’ αὐτό and πρός τι, but complains that Aristotle did not discuss the former sufficiently; see Griffin 2015: 89-
90); Ps-Callicratadas F 1, p. 103.11-14 Thesleff (mathematicised: ‘the odd is generated by the nature of the 
καθ’αὐτό, the even is generated by the nature of the πρός τι’), although the evidence for ps-Archytas adopting 
such a bicategorialization of beings is not existent (pace Bonazzi 2013a: 183 and 2013b: 389-390).  It should 
moreover be noted that there is, to my knowledge, no evidence of these figures explicitly associating nature with 
the category of relatives, as Plutarch does.   
41
 Cf. Bouffartigue 2012: 70, who nonetheless does not mention Seneca.  Generally, on the animal soul among the 
Stoics, see Long 1996: 240-244. 
42
 Seneca, Epistle 121.21.  Compare the views ascribed to the Stoics by Diogenes Laertius (VII.86-87 = Posidonius F 
185 Kidd) and Clement of Alexandria (Stromat. II.19 = SVF II.714).  On the Stoic typology of impulse, see the 
discussion of Arius Didymus’ doxographical account (ap. Stob. II.9-9a, pp. 86.17-87.22 Wachsmuth) at Inwood 
1985: 224-242.  
43
 For the fragments of Hierocles, I use Ilaria Ramelli’s edition (2009), substantially based on Bastianini and Long’s 
edition in vol. 1.1** of the Corpus dei papyri filosofici greci e latini (1992), with translation of the fragments by 
David Konstan. 
44
 Hierocles, Elements of Ethics Col. I.37-40, Cols. I.50-II.3.  On the Stoic αἴ σθησις and ὁρμή, see Inwood 1984: 155-
156. 
45
 Hierocles, Elements of Ethics Col. II.3-9.  Cf. Ramelli 2009: 113.  For plants’ ‘nature’ (φύσις) as that which ‘binds 
together, preserves, nourishes, and increases’ them, see Elements of Ethics Col. VI.15-22.   
46
 Hierocles, Elements of Ethics Cols. III.46-54 and IV.24-29. 
47
 Hierocles, Elements of Ethics Col. III.47-50. 
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48
 For a useful, succinct analysis of Hierocles’ approach to oikeiôsis (with bibliography), see Ramelli 2009: xxx-xlvii. 
49
 See Hierocles, Elements of Ethics Col. III.50-53. 
50
 On why nature encourages humans to promote social bonds, see Hierocles, On Marriage F 7 Ramelli = Stobaeus 
4.84.20, pp. 664.4-12 Hense.  That marriage, the primary social bond, is divine, is attested at On Marriage F 4 
Ramelli = Stobaeus 4.67.24, p. 503.18-19 Hense. 
51
 Compare Plut. De an. procr. 1026, where the irrational part of the world-soul is described as being ‘accustomed 
to the body from the beginning’ (σώματι σύνηθες ἐξ ἀρχῆς) and subsequently as being ‘dragged down’ 
(ἐφέλκεται) through its common affection with the body (συμπαθές).  Cf. Pl. Phaedr. 248c-d. 
52
 At Animine an corporis affectiones sint peiores 3, 501d, Plutarch defines impulses as ‘principles of actions’ and 
explains that ‘excessive affections arise out of impulses’ (αἱ  γὰρ ὁρμαὶ  τῶν πράξεων ἀρχαί, τὰ δὲ πάθη 
σφοδρότητες ὁρμῶν).  Generally, this passage is a rationalization of the portion of Socrates’ Palinode that deals 
with the soul-chariot’s reaction to an impulse generated by a beautiful boy (Phaedr. 253d-254e).  Note, too, that 
Cleanthes, who denied that animals admit of reason (λόγος), nevertheless possess the elements of λόγισμος, 
which is understood to be a very basic sort of exchange (SVF 1.515a-b = Plut. Soll. an. 967e and Ael. Nat. an. 6.50). 
53
 Note that, in Socrates’ Palinode (Pl. Phaedr. 254b-e), the charioteer, struck by the boy’s beauty, is forced to use 
violence in order to control the hubristic horse.  For Plutarch’s use of this image, see Opsomer 2012: 329.  
54
 Similarly, see Philo’s own explanation of how non-human animals speak musically, but without articulation or 
argument, which is the power only of humans (De animalibus 98-99). 
55
 Again, this is not a position very divergent from Seneca’s in Epistle 121.6 (Mirari solemus saltandi peritos, quod in 
omnem significationem rerum et adfectuum parata illorum est manus, et verborum vocitatem gestus adsequitur.  
Quod illis ars praestat, his natura.), except that there we see no explicit appeal to ‘reason’ in Seneca’s account.  
Bouffartigue (2012: xxvi) usefully compares with Origen (Contra Celsum IV.81): ‘selon laquelle les plus stupéfiantes 
performances des animaux sont l'effet direct du pouvoir de la nature commandée par Dieu et ne doivent pas plus 
aux mérites de la bête que la beauté de la rose à la vertu du rosier.’  On the ethics of human use of animals in 
Plutarch, we agree here with the conclusions of Fögen (2014: 222-223): ‘On a moral level…humans may use 
animals for their own purposes, but should refrain from any inconsiderate or cruel behaviour towards them.’ 
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56
 Plutarch suggests elsewhere (De am. prol. 2, 495a) that σύνεσις τοῦ λόγου is not accessible to non-human 
animals.  My approach to animal cognition in Plutarch, then, runs parallel to that of Bouffartigue (2012: xxx-xxxiii), 
who seeks to differentiate those virtues that non-human animals are able to achieve from those that humans 
regularly display. 
57
 Compare Socrates’ etymological definition (Cratyl. 412a-b) of the activity of σύνεσις as ‘the soul advancing 
along with things’ (συμπορεύεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν τοῖ ς πράγμασιν).  Socrates claims in the Funeral Oration in the 
Menexenus (237d) that nature selected from all the animals the human being to be ‘the one who excels in 
comprehension over the others, and who alone reckons justice and the gods’ (ὃ συνέσει τε ὑπερέχει τῶν ἄλλων 
καὶ  δίκην καὶ  θεοὺς μόνον νομίζει).  
58
 Compare the Platonist definition of justice (δικαιοσύνη) as ‘agreement of the soul relative to itself, and good 
order of the parts of the soul relative to one another and in reference to one another’ ([Pl.] Def. 411d-e). 
59
 On animal κοινωνία in Plutarch, see Bouffartigue 2012: xxxi. 
60
 On the name Γρύλλος, see Herchenroeder 2008: 350-359. 
61
 Or, possibly, another Greek who was not among his men (see Konstan 2010-11: 371 n. 1).  But Odysseus calls the 
Greeks his hetaireioi, which suggests a closer relationship. 
62
 This is of course not an impossibility, since Philo (De animalibus 30-65) develops a Platonist argument (in the 
voice of his nephew Alexander) for attributing the cardinal virtues to non-human animals and arguing that, in 
some circumstances, non-human animals demonstrate more virtue than humans (see, e.g. De animalibus 61, on 
justice). 
63
 Herchenroeder 2008: 362-367 and Konstan 2010-11: 382 n. 20. 
64
 Or, as Konstan (2010-11: 372) describes, ‘Circe provides them with consciousness and speech’.  ‘Consciousness’ 
is an equally good translation of σύνεσις, but, I would argue, διαλέγεσθαι goes beyond mere ‘speech’ here.  
65
 It is probable that an audience would detect contemporary philosophical notions here: is Odysseus asking 
Gryllus whether he’d like to be returned to his original species, or to the ‘form’ of man?  Or is there a more general 
reference to returning his men back to their original character (as one finds, for example, in Philo’s Stoicizing 
description of the souls of young men evidencing their ἀρχαῖ ον εἶ δος at Quod omnis probus liber sit 15)? 
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66
 Konstan 2012: 5-6.  For a comprehensive discussion of Epicureanism and pigs, see Warren 2002: 130-141. 
67
 Also see D.L. 10.138 (= F 504 Usener), where the Epicurean position that one should choose the virtues not for 
their own sake, but for the sake of pleasure (i.e. the final good), is compared with the taking of medication for 
health. 
68
 Also cf. Sent. Vat. 14: δὶ ς δὲ οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι. 
69
 Phld. Mort. 39.7: ‘But because of an attachment to life that results from being frightened of death, not because 
they live pleasantly, they seem even to banish applications of the mind to it’ (trans. Henry) (ἀλλ’ ἐοίκασι διὰ τὸ 
φιλόζωον ἐκ τοῦ πεφρικέναι τὸν θάνατον, οὐ διὰ τὸ βιοῦν ἡδέως, καὶ  τὰς ἐπιβολὰς τὰς ἐπ’ αὐτὸν έξωθεῖ ν...). 
70
 Diogenes of Oenoanda F 73 Smith (text and tr. Smith): ‘…when you make these statements concerning death 
and you have persuaded me to laugh at it.  For I have no fear on account of the Tityuses and Tantaluses whom 
some describe in Hades, nor do I shudder (οὐδὲ φρίττω) when I reflect upon the decomposition of the body, being 
convinced that we have no feeling, once the soul is without sensation, or anything else.’  For a comprehensive 
discussion of the semantics of φρίσσω, with special reference to its significance for Plutarch, see Cairns 2013 
(without discussion, however, of the Epicurean notion of ‘shuddering at death’). 
71
 Cf. Cairns 2013: 95-98. 
72
 Stobaeus attributes the quotation to Pythagoras, but various parallels show that this is a misattribution (see F 
221 Usener loc. cit.). 
73
 F 221 Usener. 
74
 Compare Cicero’s attribution (De Officiis 3.117 = F 514 Usener) to the Epicureans of this claim concerning 
temperance (temperantia): ‘they say that the greatness of pleasure is limited by the removal of pain’ (dicunt enim 
voluptatis magnitudinem doloris detractione finiri). 
75
 There are textual problems in this sentence. 
76
 Usener included the material up to this point in this passage as reflecting Epicurean ethics (see F 456 Usener). 
77
 Konstan 2012: 5-6. See Kuriai Doxai 29: ‘Among the desires, some are natural and <necessary; some natural,> 
but not necessary; and some are neither natural nor necessary, but arise out of kenodoxia (empty opinion)’ (τῶν 
ἐπιθυμῶν αἱ  μέν εἰ σι φυσικαὶ  καὶ  <ἀναγκαῖ αι· αἱ  δὲ φυσικαὶ  μὲν> οὐκ ἀναγκαῖ αι <δὲ·> αἱ  δὲ οὔτε φυσικαὶ  
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οὔτε ἀναγκαῖ αι ἀλλὰ παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν γινόμεναι).  For further comparanda, see Cic. Tusc. 5.33 and Schol. in 
Arist. Eth. Nicom. 3.13 (= F 456 Usener).  
78
 Kuriai Doxai 30: ‘In the case of desires that are natural, but do not lead to a sense of pain (if they are not fulfilled, 
the straining is intense), such desires arise out of kenodoxia, and it is not owing to their own nature that they are 
not dispelled, but to the kenodoxia of the human being’ (ἐν αἷ ς τῶν φυσικῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, μὴ ἐπ’ ἀλγοῦν δὲ 
ἐπαναγουσῶν, ἐὰν μὴ συντελεσθῶσιν, ὑπάρχει ἡ σπουδὴ σύντονος, παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν αὖται γίνονται, καὶ  οὐ 
παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν οὐ διαχέονται ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κενοδοξίαν). 
79
 Generally descending from Plato (concerns about psychological and political ochlocracy: Rep. 576c-577d and 
Laws 714a; the goal of autarchy in the primitive city-state: Rep. 369b-d; praise of autarchy and fear of the sea in 
the founding of Magnesia: Laws 704e-705b) and Aristotle (self-sufficiency a natural goal of the polis: Politics Books 
I-II, esp. I.2, 1252b and II.3, 1261b).  For self-sufficiency in Epicureanism, see F 458 and 476 Usener. 
80
 Fitzgibbon 2008. 
81
 Newmyer 2006: 38-40. 
82
 Likely a reference to Epicurus’ (controversial) claim that φρόνησις as more honourable (τιμιώτερον) than 
φιλοσοφία (Ep. Men. 132). 
83
 An extensive version of such claims can be found voiced by Philo himself in De Animalibus 98. 
84
 Generally, on Hemarchus, see Vander Waerdt 1988. 
85
 On the role of nature in the Gryllus, see Herchenroeder 2008: 359-361. 
86
 Newmyer 2006: 61. It is notable, for example, that Gryllus’ Epicurean sentiments do not extend to the claim – 
which could certainly not be accepted by a Platonist or Stoic – that pleasure is the final good. 
87
 Compare, again, Epicurus’ praise of φρόνησις as more honourable than φιλοσοφία (Ep. Men. 132).  
88
 Ep. Men. 132. 
89
 Mentioned above on p. XXXX. 
90
 In On Irrational Contempt (Col. XXV Indelli) the Epicurean Polystratus apparently attacks some unknown 
opponents for not recognizing the difference between predicates that are relative and those are of a ‘peculiar 
42 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
nature’.  It’s not clear how Gryllus should be thought to adapt such arguments, partially because of problems with 
reconstructing Polystratus’ text.  See Warren 2002: 146-148.   
91
 Especially in the dialogue On the Fact That Epicurus makes a Pleasant Life Impossible (21-23, 1101c-1103e).  This 
is not the place to discuss the reliability of Plutarch’s presentation of Epicurean theology and theological 
epistemology, but for a good recent discussion of the complexities, see Konstan 2010-11. 
92
 The Epicurean Philodemus (On the Gods Cols. XII and XV Diels) preserves a set of arguments contending that 
animals are happier because they have no knowledge of the gods; it is possible that these arguments are implied, 
or at least of a piece, with Gryllus’.  On this text of Philodemus, see Warren 2002: 139-140. 
93
 For Plutarch’s commitment to the bios theoretikos, see Bonazzi 2012: 146-149.  I would emphasise, however, 
Plutarch’s qualified inclusivity with regard to Epicureanism – Platonism is the supreme type of philosophy, but 
even Epicureanism has something to contribute. 
94
 See, e.g., Alcin. Didask.4, 155.20-28, where νόησις is defined as ‘the activity of intellect when contemplating the 
primary intelligibles’ (νόησις δ’ ἐστὶ  νοῦ ἐνέργεια θεωροῦντος τὰ πρῶτα νοητά).  Cf. Tarrant 2000: 173-174.   
95
 In the divided-line passage, νόησις is finally referred to as such at R. 511d8, where it is directed ‘towards the part 
that is highest’ (νόησις...ἐπὶ  τῳ ἀνωτάτω). 
96
 Alcin. Didask. 10, 165.16-34.  For Middle Platonist epistemology, including a careful analysis of Alcinous’ 
description of νόησις, see Chapter 13 of Boys-Stones’ forthcoming source book on Middle Platonist Philosophy. 
97
 There are some textual problems in this section, and I have adopted the interpretation of Cherniss in his Loeb 
edition. 
98
 The association is comparably old and relatively common in Greek tragedy (e.g. Aeschyl. F 567 Sommerstein; 
Soph. Aj. 189, Phil. 417 and 1311; Eur. IA 524) and commented on by Hyginus (Fab. 201). 
99
 DK 88 B 25 = Sext. Adv. Math. IX.54.  For a nuanced discussion of the authorship and the possibilities that 
anonymity made possible for proffering atheistic views in Athens, see Sedley 2013: 335-337. 
100
 Note the near-exact repetition at the end of the Gryllus, where Odysseus was described as ‘so wise and 
remarkable’ (σοφὸν οὕτως ὄντα καὶ  περιττὸν). 
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101
 Herchenroeder 2008: 353.  Or, an alternative translation that preserves the ambiguity would be ‘how does this 
relate to reason?’  This strikingly polyvalent retort arises directly out of Odysseus’ equally potent question, 
regarding the genus of Gryllus, ‘what sort of human being is this?’ (ἢ τίς ἦν οὗτος ἀνθρώπων;).  Even Plutarch’s 
jokes play on the difference between an absolute substance and a relative. 
